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ABSTRACT
The ongoing Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has posed a growing challenge to the
implementation of monetary stimulus measures in both sovereign (e.g. US, UK,
Japan) and non-sovereign (eurozone) economies. With the policy rate close to the
zero nominal bound, the UK has relied on quantitative easing, ostensibly to
improve market liquidity and/or stimulate economic activity, despite being freed
from the policy constraints of a non-sovereign economy. The evidence regarding
the macroeconomic effects of quantitative easing is, however, largely inconclu-
sive. Meanwhile, UK growth forecasts have been revised downwards but, at the
time of writing, the government remains committed to its fiscal austerity pro-
gramme. In this paper we explore the origins of quantitative easing, its under-
lying objectives, the theoretical arguments for its use and the empirical evidence
concerning its impact. Our analysis focuses on the policies of the Bank of
England since the advent of the GFC, and is informed by the principles of
Modern Monetary Theory.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) posed a fundamental challenge toorthodox macroeconomic stabilisation policies. While monetary authori-ties quickly responded to the liquidity shock following the collapse of
some large US financial institutions, ongoing downward adjustment of official
rates was constrained by the zero nominal bound. In addition, there was a
‘disconnection between official rates and market rates’ (Joyce et al. 2012, p.
F276). Hence, the conventional channel for monetary policy was soon
exhausted.
Since 2008, many central banks have devised and implemented an
assortment of ‘unconventional’ monetary policies, ostensibly to strengthen
market liquidity and stimulate economic growth. The IMF has supported the
use of such measures (see Sharpe and Watts, 2012). Quantitative easing (QE)
is arguably the most ‘conventional unconventional’ monetary policy (King,
2009), and has been identified with the Bank of Japan’s (BoJ) market inter-
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ventions between 2001 and 2006. QE entailed the purchase of government
securities, primarily from commercial banks, by crediting their reserve
accounts held at the central bank. While the BoJ targeted specific balances of
excess reserves, the objective was to keep prices from declining and to provide
a basis for sustained economic growth.
Between March 2009 and July 2012 the Bank of England (BoE), via its
Asset Purchase Facility (APF), was authorised to purchase assets valued at
£375 billion, mainly consisting of medium- to long-term UK government debt
or ‘gilts’. These asset purchases followed the official Bank Rate being cut to 0.5
per cent in March 2009, which the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) indicat-
ed was its lowest practical level.
Initially, QE was implemented to address the threat of deflation. There
is now a growing body of empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of QE
in the UK, but the results remain largely inconclusive, since the efficacy of QE
is particularly difficult to ascertain in the context of broad macroeconomic
uncertainty, fiscal withdrawal and a deepening eurozone malaise. The eco-
nomic reality is clear, however, with the UK experiencing a double dip reces-
sion in 2011-2012 and an unemployment rate of about eight per cent. The UK
economy is suffering the weakest recovery from a crisis in recent history (IMF,
2013).
The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, we explore the origins of
QE, its underlying objectives, how it has been implemented, and the ostensi-
ble theoretical and empirical arguments for its use. Second, by an evaluation
of the available evidence, we assess whether QE has fulfilled its stated objec-
tive(s). Our analysis focuses on the policies of the BoE since the advent of the
GFC, and is informed by the principles of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT).
Section 2 outlines the context, theory and implementation of uncon-
ventional monetary policy. The BoE's recent QE policies are then discussed,
along with the available evidence. Section 4 critically assesses QE policies by
drawing on the principles of MMT. Concluding remarks then follow.
2.UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY: CONTEXT, THEORY AND IMPLEMENTATION
Unconventional monetary policy encompasses measures which cause a
change in the size and/or composition of a central bank’s balance sheet
(Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004). These can be broadly classified, but not lim-
ited to: an explicit commitment to low policy interest rates; the provision of
low-cost funds to financial institutions; the purchase of long-term government
securities to reduce long-term interest rates; and, direct and specific inter-
ventions into credit markets (Klyuev et al. 2009).
Since the advent of the GFC, many central banks have devised and
implemented unconventional monetary measures, given; (1) policy rates can-
not be reduced below zero since agents can always hold (non-interest bearing)
cash (i.e. the zero nominal bound); and, (2) solvency concerns surrounding
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financial intermediation have disrupted the (standard) relationship between
official and market rates (Joyce et al. 2012). The policy challenge became one
of stimulating the economy so that conventional monetary policy, targeting
price (and financial) stability, could be reinstated (Joyce et al. 2012). While
there are no generally accepted ‘rules of engagement’, so that policies were
sometimes ad hoc, unconventional monetary measures have ostensibly been
geared to financial market stability, the facilitation of corporate financing and
stimulating economic growth (Shiratsuka, 2010).
Asset purchases allegedly affect aggregate demand via a number of
channels. First, purchases of long-term securities can reduce the long-end of
the yield curve, causing investors to ‘rebalance’ their portfolios by purchasing
assets with greater duration or higher credit risk. The resulting rise in asset
prices eases credit conditions and generates capital gains for households, who
are assumed to consume part of the increase in wealth (Joyce et al. 2012).
This is the so called portfolio (re)balance channel (see Tobin, 1969; Brunner
and Meltzer, 1973) and is illustrated by the upper half of Figure 1. Second, the
central bank (explicitly) commits to a monetary stimulus allegedly reducing
expected short- and long-term interest rates, while lowering uncertainty,
increasing confidence and reducing risk premiums (Meaning and Zhu, 2011).
This is the signalling channel.2 Third, the bank funding/lending channel, the
lower half of Figure 1, suggests that increased bank deposits and reserves cre-
ated by asset purchases from non-bank institutions will increase the avail-
ability of bank credit, and so, banks may be more willing to lend (Benford et
al. 2009; Joyce et al. 2012).
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Figure 1. Transmission mechanisms of asset purchases
Source: Joyce et al. (2012)
The BoJ’s unconventional monetary measures are an important precur-
sor to recent policies.3 The Japanese economy had struggled to return to a sta-
ble growth path since the early 1990s. The BoJ expressed concern about the
deflationary impact of weak demand. Also, ‘Japanese financial institutions as a
whole confronted severe credit constraints’ (Shiratsuka, 2010, p. 88). In 2001,
the economic conditions justified ‘monetary easing as drastic as is unlikely to be
taken under ordinary circumstances’ (BoJ, 2001, no page numbers).
A zero-interest rate policy was implemented (1999-2000), with QE
adopted subsequently (2001-2006). An explicit commitment to low (or zero)
policy rates is alleged to anchor market expectations of inflation, and prevent
a rise in real interest rates (Okina and Shiratsuka, 2004; Klyuev et al. 2009;
Blinder, 2010).
QE involved an explicit target for bank reserves at the BoJ and conse-
quently a decline in the overnight call (policy) rate. The BoJ also committed to
increase its outright purchases of long-term government bonds (primarily from
commercial banks), to inject liquidity which facilitated the other objectives.
While purchases of long-term securities may signal an intention to reduce
long-term interest rates (Klyuev et al. 2009; Blinder, 2010), the relatively small
purchases of these securities and the ‘banknote rule’ indicate that this may
not have been the BoJ’s intention at this time (Shiratsuka, 2010).4
Furthermore, the liquidity injection 
may not translate into larger amounts of credit provided to households and
firms if banks are concerned about their capital adequacy, are in the
process of reducing the size and the level or risk embedded in their balance
sheets, and/or are risk adverse due to a weak economic backdrop in which
to lend (Klyuev et al. 2009, p. 10).5
The BoJ’s unconventional measures were to be abandoned when the
consumer price index (CPI) stabilised or increased. This occurred on March 9,
2006. While the counterfactual is difficult to establish, empirical evidence sug-
gests that the BoJ’s policies had little effect on aggregate variables such as
output and inflation (Borio and Disyatat, 2009; Shiratsuka, 2010; Wieland,
2010). Consequently, empirical studies have focused on financial variables
and announcement effects.
In a survey of the literature, Ugai (2007, quoted in Blinder, 2010, pp.
18-19) concludes that the evidence ‘confirms a clear effect’ of the ‘commitment’
policy on short- and medium-term interest rates but offers only ‘mixed’ evi-
dence that ‘expansion of the monetary base and altering the composition of
the BOJ's balance sheet’ had much effect. Bernanke et al. (2004) found that
the BoJ’s policy reduced the yield curve by approximately 50 basis points (see
also Oda and Ueda, 2007).
More recently, BoJ (2010) made an explicit commitment to reduce long-
term interest rates via the provision of extraordinary amounts of long-term
funds at extremely low interest rates (see also the ECB’s LTROs; Meier, 2009).
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However falling Treasury (risk-free) yields may not significantly affect ‘private
borrowing rates and credit market risk premiums as heightened risk aversion
reduces the substitutability between government and private assets’ (Klyuev et
al. 2009, p. 10). This is perhaps why Bernanke (2009) distinguished between
the unconventional measures of the BoJ and the US Federal Reserve (Fed),
labelling the latter ‘credit easing’.
Credit easing largely involves central bank interventions into specific
segments of credit markets to extend credit or purchase securities, such as
commercial paper, corporate bonds and asset-backed securities (Klyuev et al.
2009). The purchase of credit products may involve the simultaneous sale of
government securities (compositional effect) and/or the increase in reserve
balances (size effect). In any case, credit easing attempts to alleviate illiquid
trading conditions, reduce liquidity premiums and encourage origination
(Klyuev et al. 2009). Notwithstanding this, the distinction between quantita-
tive and credit easing remains unclear.
In theory, given that ‘private borrowing, lending, and spending deci-
sions presumably depend on (risky) non-Treasury rates, reducing their
spreads over (riskless) Treasuries will reduce the interest rates that matter for
actual transactions even if riskless rates are unchanged’ (Blinder, 2010, p. 4,
emphasis in original). The effectiveness, however, will depend on the degree of
substitutability between the assets being purchased.
In summary, unconventional monetary policies represent measures
causing a change in the size and/or composition of the central bank's balance
sheet. However low policy rates and unconventional measures are not neces-
sarily separate policies, since the latter can cause the former via a size effect.
Second, there are no universally-accepted definitions of quantitative easing
and credit easing. QE involves a quantity change on a central bank's balance
sheet. However, in this sense, QE and credit easing are not mutually exclu-
sive. Finally, the unconventional policy mix is largely contextual and not nec-
essarily doctrinal (Bernanke, 2009) so, in practice, central banks will tailor the
overall policy package to their specific context, restrictions and shocks (Klyuev
et al. 2009; Shiratsuka, 2010).
In the next section we outline and discuss the unconventional mone-
tary policies of the BoE in the context of the GFC. To avoid definitional confu-
sion, we adopt the BoE’s terminology.
3. BANK OF ENGLAND AND THE CRISIS
3.1. Policy response
Economic activity in the UK has remained largely stagnant since the advent of
the GFC. While fiscal stimulus measures were pursued temporarily, and ster-
ling depreciated sharply following the Lehman Brothers collapse in September
2008, the BoE's Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) became increasingly con-
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cerned with nominal spending, considering it too weak to meet the medium-
term inflation target (Benford et al. 2009). Annual nominal GDP growth (to Q1
2009) had fallen by 2.4 per cent, its lowest level since records began in 1955
(Benford et al. 2009).
Consequently, the MPC decided that further monetary easing was
required. Following cuts of three percentage points in the Bank Rate during
Q4 2008 and a further 1½ percentage points in early 2009, the BoE then
reduced the policy rate to 0.5 per cent in March 2009; the lowest rate since
the BoE was formed in 1694 (Benford et al. 2009; Mitchell, 2009). The con-
ventional monetary policy channel had now been exhausted.
The BoE turned to QE which involved the purchase of public and pri-
vate sector assets using central bank money (i.e. creating reserves) (Benford et
al. 2009). The Bank reaffirmed its commitment to price stability (i.e. an infla-
tion rate of 2 per cent), while supporting the government's economic policies
for growth and employment (Benford et al. 2009). The asset purchases were
alleged to facilitate the achievement of these objectives. Asset purchases were
conducted via the BoE's Asset Purchase Facility (APF) which was established
as a subsidiary in January 2009. Both the APF and BoE were granted full
indemnity by HM Treasury for any ‘losses’ incurred by the facility. Bean (2009,
p. 3) summarises the mechanics of QE:
The Asset Purchase Facility buys assets funded by a loan from the Bank.
In turn, the Bank funds that loan through additional reserve
creation…When the Asset Purchase Facility buys a gilt from a pension
fund, say, it can be thought of as paying with a cheque drawn on the Bank
of England. The pension fund will then bank the cheque with its own com-
mercial bank, so the latter now has a claim on the Bank of England — that
is what reserves are. 
Between March and November 2009 the MPC authorised the purchase of £200
billion of assets, primarily longer-term government bonds (gilts) (see Figure
2a). The first round of purchases represented nearly 30 per cent of the private
sector's holdings of gilts and approximately 14 per cent of annual nominal
GDP (Joyce et al. 2011a). A second round of purchases (£75 billion) began in
October 2011, followed by £50 billion in February 2012 and a further £50 bil-
lion in July 2012. The BoE's gilt holdings from the APF are now worth £375
billion.
The APF also purchased private sector assets though the Corporate
Bond Secondary Market Scheme, and Secured Commercial Paper Facility
(BoE, 2012a). The purchases of high-quality commercial paper and corporate
bonds, however, differed from the gilt purchases, since the operations were
largely 'financed' by the issue of Treasury bills and the Debt Management
Office's cash management facilities. Furthermore, ‘[t]he scale of these opera-
tions was much less than for the gilt purchases, consistent with the Bank act-
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ing as a backstop purchaser/seller with the intention of improving market
functioning’ (Joyce et al. 2011a, p. 200).



















Drawing on the BoJ’s earlier experience, the MPC had ‘expected the
additional monetary injection not to stimulate bank lending directly at the
current juncture’ (Bean, 2009, p. 4). Thus, APF’s purchases were ‘targeted at
assets held primarily by the non-bank private sector’ (Bean, 2009, p. 4). BoE
(2012b) outlines the rationale:
The Bank of England electronically creates new money and uses it to pur-
chase gilts from private investors such as pension funds and insurance
companies. These investors typically do not want to hold on to this money,
because it yields a low return. So they tend to use it to purchase other
assets, such as corporate bonds and shares. That lowers longer-term bor-
rowing costs and encourages the issuance of new equities and bonds.
Benford et al. (2009) provide a detailed account of the APF operations. While
Bean (2009) and Benford et al. (2009) note that the MPC emphasises the port-
folio (re)balance channel, the committee also appears reliant on ‘well-estab-
lished’ monetarist relationships between narrow money, broad money and
nominal demand (Meier, 2009).
Banks gain both new reserves and a corresponding new customer deposit
when assets are purchased from non-banks. A higher level of liquid assets
could encourage them to extend more new loans than they would otherwise
have done… More bank lending to households and companies should help
to support higher consumption and investment (Benford et al. 2009, p. 93).
‘The MPC also argues that the increased money supply could induce addi-
tional bank lending and, possibly, increase spending directly, for example, by
raising inflation expectations’ (Meier 2009, p. 24). Notwithstanding this,
Benford et al. (2009, p. 98) maintain that, while the money multiplier (i.e. the
ratio of broad money to central bank money) is ‘not a direct causal relation-
ship’, ‘[i]n current conditions, the marginal impact on broad money of a
change in reserves is likely to be much smaller than implied by the current
ratio.’ Furthermore, asset purchases are alleged to buttress other BoE initia-
tives to support the banking sector, 'to make the effect of higher reserves on
lending (the bank lending channel) more powerful' (Benford et al. 2009, p. 98).
Thus, the relevance of the money multiplier is not dismissed.
Interestingly, Meier (2009, pp. 24-25, emphasis added) notes:
[T]he liquidity injection of GBP 75 billion was calibrated so as to make up
for a projected shortfall in nominal demand of about the same amount (5
per cent of GDP), based on an assumed marginal money multiplier and
money velocity of one. The significant uncertainty surrounding the trans-
mission of QE — explicitly acknowledged by the MPC — would seem to cau-
tion against relying too much on any such numerical assumptions. Indeed,
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the MPC did not refer back to this quantitative rule of thumb when it
increased the QE target to GBP 125 billion in May.
Benford et al. (2009, p. 91) argue rather vaguely that ‘[t]he expansion of broad
money is a key part of the transmission mechanism for quantitative easing. It
should ultimately lead to an increase in asset prices and spending and there-
fore bring inflation back to target.’ This is a curious argument. First, the
expansion of broad money is the outcome of a sequence of asset purchases
(and higher asset prices) rather than its initiating cause. Second, the non-
bank private sector has merely changed the composition of its asset holdings,
so it is unclear why the increased stock of broad money, ex post, should pro-
mote higher spending more generally. Also, the purchase of gilts and/or pri-
vate assets from the banks would be expected to raise asset prices.6 In the
depressed economic climate, the BoE appeared reluctant to rely solely on
these lower interest rates to stimulate spending via interest-sensitive compo-
nents of investment and consumption. If the flood of reserves did not encour-
age banks to increase lending to the non-bank private sector, Benford et al.
(2009, p. 93) argue that ‘the extra reserves may contribute to a decline in the
interest rate that banks pay to borrow from each other.’
Likewise, Meier (2009, p. 29) contends that ‘[t]o the extent that bank
funding costs decline…banks might be induced to provide loans at lower inter-
est rates…’ However, since December 2010:
commercial banks are not required to disclose a [reserves] target to the BoE
and all reserve balances attract the Bank Rate [i.e. a floor system] which is
designed to establish a benchmark, short-term, risk-free rate [see Figure
2c]. Thus, there is no downward pressure on the market rate following the
increase in reserves, above the level required for inter-bank transactions
(Watts, 2012, p. 10).
In these circumstances, monetary management by the BoE is not required.
The money multiplier will be further unpacked in Section 4. An orthodox per-
spective on the dangers of QE by the BoE is outlined by Meier (2009, pp. 19-
20). He notes the possibility of reputational risk associated with 'squandering
taxpayer money', even though the presence of strong 'capital cushions' or
indemnity arrangements enables its balance sheet to withstand some finan-
cial loss. In addition, such loss making 'could weaken political support for its
independence and erode the legitimacy of its policy mandate.' He expresses
concern that unconventional operations place the BoE in roles normally
assumed by the private sector or government. Further, while buying gilts
avoids these risks, the purchases expose the BoE to the charge of capture by
the fiscal authority, since these purchases alleviate interest rate pressures in
the debt market, particularly in the presence of high deficits. Also, such large
scale operations can give rise to policy conflicts over the appropriate extent
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and timing of central bank purchases and sales. In short, Meier (2009) asserts
that these unconventional monetary policies can promote market fears about
fiscal dominance and the consequent loss of monetary policy discipline with
respect to the pursuit of price stability.
Two comments are apposite. First, the motivation for ‘unconventional’
monetary policy in 2009 was the prospect of price deflation. Inflation has since
recovered (see Figure 3d). Second, Meier (2009) fails both to recognise the role
of the BoE as a currency ‘issuer’ as opposed to a currency ‘user’, and to out-
line what constitutes fiscal sustainability for a sovereign economy, where gov-
ernment has the full array of macroeconomic policy instruments at its dis-
posal.
3.2. Empirical evidence
There is a growing body of empirical literature regarding the effectiveness of
the BoE’s QE measures. These studies have focused largely on financial vari-
ables, revealing some support for the portfolio rebalancing channel, as asset
prices have increased and consequently borrowing costs declined. Evidence of
a change in spending is, however, more difficult to identify, particularly given
the limited historical precedence for this type of policy (Joyce et al. 2012).
Announcement effects are estimated to have reduced gilt yields by 40-
120 basis points (Meier, 2009; Joyce et al. 2011a, 2011b; Joyce and Tong,
2012). Christensen and Rudebusch (2012) decompose the announcement
effects on gilt yields, suggesting that the decline had been driven principally
by reductions in term premiums.7
Meaning and Zhu (2011) estimate a 56 basis point decline in BBB cor-
porate bond yields, one day, and 98 basis points, two days, after the
announcement of asset purchases. Furthermore, econometric estimates
revealed the first round of asset purchases reduced gilt yields, with remaining
maturity of 5 to 25 years, by 27 basis points, on average (see also Breedon et
al. 2012).
Recent estimates of macroeconomic effects indicate that QE could have
increased real GDP in the range of 1.5 to 2 per cent, and increased inflation
by 0.75 to 1.5 percentage points (Joyce et al. 2011b; Bridges and Thomas,
2012; Kapetanios et al. 2012). In a counterfactual analysis, Pesaran and
Smith (2012) estimate a temporary output growth increase of between 0.75
and 1 percentage point (see also Kapetanios et al. 2012).
It is, however, extremely difficult to isolate the impact of the BoE's QE
policy in the context of broad macroeconomic uncertainty, fiscal withdrawal
and the deepening eurozone malaise. Consequently, empirical estimates are
heavily qualified. Despite the BoE’s concerted, and ‘unconventional’, attempts
to increase nominal demand growth since 2009, real economic growth in the
UK remains stagnant and unemployment is high (see Figures 3a and 3c).
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4. A MODERN MONEY CRITIQUE
Despite temporary fiscal stimulus measures during 2008 and 2009, UK poli-
cymakers have relied almost exclusively on (unconventional) monetary policy
in response to the GFC, which brought about the worst economic downturn
since the Great Depression (IMF, 2009). We now draw on the principles of
Modern Monetary Theory to critically assess the BoE’s QE measures, includ-
ing the Bank’s rationale for its asset purchases, in the context of fiscal aus-
terity. We recognise, however, that central banks have limited capacity to
stimulate economic activity.
Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) represents an ‘accounting-consistent,
operationally-sound theoretical approach to understanding the way fiat mon-
etary systems work and how policy changes are likely to play out’ (Mitchell,
2011). MMT makes the important distinction between a sovereign and non-
sovereign economy, by drawing on the principles of Chartalism (see Minsky,
1986; Wray, 1998) and Functional Finance (Lerner, 1943; Forstater, 1999;
Watts and Sharpe, 2013). According to Functional Finance, ‘[g]overnment
should adjust its rates of expenditure and taxation such that total spending
in the economy is neither more nor less than that which is sufficient to pur-
chase the full employment level of output at current prices’ (Lerner, 1943, p.
354).
From this perspective, the UK is a sovereign economy. The consolidat-
ed government sector (Treasury and central bank) is the sole ‘issuer’ of its own
fiat non-convertible currency which is subject to a flexible exchange rate
(Mitchell and Muysken, 2008; Kelton, 2011). Thus monetary policy is freed
from the need to defend foreign exchange reserves, and the government does
not face an ex ante or inter-temporal budget constraint (Sharpe and Watts,
2012; Watts and Sharpe, 2013). When HM Treasury spends, it credits the
domestic bank accounts of firms that sell goods and services to the govern-
ment, so the very act of spending leads to an increase in the stock of broad
money. These vertical transactions between the government and the non-gov-
ernment sector increase reserve balances or system liquidity. Both government
spending and the purchases of assets from the non-government sector by the
central bank transfer fiat money to the non-government sector in the form of
additional reserve balances. Conversely, taxes and sales of financial assets to
the non-government sector reduce reserve balances. Thus, reserves are gen-
erally created when government expenditure exceeds taxes on a given day.
MMT incorporates the fundamental insight that net government spend-
ing within a sovereign economy actually increases bank reserves and places
downward pressure on short-term interest rates, under a corridor system,
because higher government expenditure increases system liquidity. Thus,
competition is not intensifying to borrow a limited stock of loanable funds
(Mitchell and Muysken, 2008). Conversely, if a budget surplus is realised a
shortage of reserves typically occurs, which tends to increase the overnight
(interbank) rate above the target rate. The BoE ensures that, collectively, com-
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mercial banks can always acquire sufficient reserves balances to finance their
interbank transactions. In the presence of a system shortage, open market
operations are conducted by the BoE in the form of asset purchases from the
non-government sector. Otherwise the integrity of the payments system is
threatened.
The central bank within a sovereign economy does not sell assets to
finance net government expenditure. Rather these sales, typically under
repurchase agreement, represent an interest rate maintenance mechanism
(Fullwiler, 2006; Mitchell and Muysken, 2008). However, in both the US and
UK, the support rate paid on excess reserves equals the target rate (i.e. a floor
system), so government debt does not need to be sold to maintain the target
rate when the Treasury runs a deficit. Government securities within a sover-
eign economy, however, are popular in financial markets as they represent a
risk-free interest-bearing asset which provides a benchmark for pricing risky
financial securities, and facilitates the balancing of the risk structure of
investment portfolios (Sharpe, 2013a).
MMT maintains that government spending within a sovereign economy
is only constrained by the economy-wide availability of real goods and services,
denominated in the national currency (Mitchell and Muysken, 2008). Sovereign
economies are clearly distinct from eurozone (non-sovereign) economies which
are ‘users’ of currency (euro). Eurozone economies have (voluntarily) given up
their fiscal and monetary sovereignty and, consequently, now have limited pol-
icy options to respond to the ongoing crisis (Sharpe and Watts, 2012).
Despite temporary fiscal stimulus measures being adopted in 2008 and
2009, fiscal policy in the UK has been geared to fiscal austerity, a concept
which has no resonance within a sovereign economy. The failure to under-
stand the distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign economies in the
context of QE is illustrated by Joyce et al. (2012, p. F286): ‘Perhaps most con-
cerning is whether central bank purchases of government bonds are helping
to contribute to unsustainable levels of government debt.’8 On the other hand,
a well-known advocate of MMT argues that ‘[t]he dominance of the neo-liber-
al ideology has led governments in most countries to have eschew the adop-
tion of policies of direct job creation to reduce the rate of unemployment and
to minimise these massive costs’ (Mitchell, 2012a).
The UK government has rejected the use of stimulatory fiscal policy,
despite its more predictable effect on economic activity. Instead, the govern-
ment has perpetuated the usual neo-liberal claims, which sit comfortably with
the Conservatives’ policy agenda of small government (Juniper et al. 2013a).
UK policymakers have frequently likened government budgets to household
budgets, arguing that fiscal deficits increase future taxes which burden future
generations, and also that deficits increase interest rates and/or are inflation-
ary (Mitchell 2012a). The so called ‘expansionary fiscal contractions’ hypoth-
esis, which promotes an extreme form of neo-liberal policy, has also been
used to justify austerity measures. IMF (2012a) recently conceded that fiscal
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multipliers are higher than previously claimed, which would have reinforced
its skepticism about frontloading austerity measures. UK credit ratings have
been downgraded by two major rating agencies, Moody’s (February 2013) and
Fitch (April 2013), thereby undermining the UK’s AAA status, strengthening
the Chancellor’s objective of pursuing austerity measures, despite advice from
the IMF.9
The UK economy remains in a parlous state, recording a double-dip
recession in July 2012 (see Figure 3a; PwC, 2012a). Modest real GDP growth
of 0.3 per cent in Q1 2013 averted a triple-dip recession. The unemployment
rate has increased since 2004 (Figure 3c), and ‘investment is still being held
back by the overhang of uncertainty from the Eurozone crisis…’ (PwC, 2012a,
p. 6). Furthermore, household debt levels remain high (see below), which was
an important feature of the pre-crisis period. Mainstream economist, Larry
Summers, notes ‘[t]he cumulative output loss from this British downturn in
its first five years exceeds even that experienced during the 1930s. Forecasts
continue to be revised downwards, with a decade or more of Japan-style stag-
nation emerging as a real risk’ (quoted in Mitchell, 2012a).
In assessing the operation of QE, the question to ask is why there is
such a reliance on (unconventional) monetary policy when its real conse-
quences are problematic, notwithstanding its capacity to manipulate the yield
curve. This policy choice reflects, first, the dominance of monetary policy with-
in the neo-liberal agenda, since the achievement of low and stable inflation is
regarded as the most effective means for reducing the output gap (Blanchard
et al. 2010; Sharpe and Watts, 2012). Second, fiscal stimulus measures were
effectively ruled out, after being replaced by austerity measures which were
designed to address the deficit ‘blowout’.
As noted in Section 3, the objective of QE was to increase inflation via
aggregate demand stimulus, because nominal spending was considered too
weak to meet the medium-term inflation target (Benford et al. 2009). The BoE is
particularly reliant on the portfolio rebalance channel, since bank deposits and
gilts are not perfect substitutes because of either alleged ‘preferred habitats’ (see
Modigliani and Sutch, 1966) or the pricing of duration risk (Joyce et al. 2012).
In any case, the BoE (via the APF) buys a risk-free asset from the non-bank pri-
vate sector, in exchange for another risk-free asset, a commercial bank deposit
which is guaranteed. However, deposits typically pay lower interest than bonds
(see Figures 2b and 2d) which reduces the interest-income of savers, who are
then likely to reduce consumption expenditure (Mitchell, 2009).
In search of a higher return (given that these assets are imperfect sub-
stitutes), non-bank participants are expected to purchase commercial debt
(paper or bonds), which is a risky asset. This reduces yields in commercial
debt markets and allegedly encourages origination and investment. The
‘search for yield’ behaviour is also facilitated by the (limited) purchases of
(risky) corporate debt by the BoE to ease funding conditions (Borio and
Disyatat, 2009).
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Gilt (benchmark) yields should also fall due to these purchases flatten-
ing the yield curves for government and corporate debt, assuming credit/liq-
uidity risk premiums at the long-end of the yield curve remain at least
unchanged or decline. The available evidence largely supports these out-
comes. By targeting longer-term securities, the BoE hoped that aggregate
demand would be stimulated with the lower cost of investment funds
(Mitchell, 2009). Growth in real gross fixed capital formation, however,
remains negative (Figure 3b) and business investment is subject to consider-
able uncertainty (PwC, 2012a, 2012b).
Borio and Disyatat (2009, p. 15, footnote 25) highlight the bizarre
nature of asset purchases by a central bank:
…outright purchases of government bonds financed by the issuance of
some form of central bank liability simply replace a claim on the govern-
ment with a claim on the central bank in private sector portfolios, and
simultaneously result in an increase in the central bank's claim on the gov-
ernment that is funded by borrowing from the private sector. It is as if the
central bank borrowed from the private sector to lend to the government.
This perspective is reinforced by the BoE’s transfer to HM Treasury in late
2012 of £35 billion in gilt interest payments acquired under QE. The Institute
for Fiscal Studies has argued that the Chancellor must instruct the Office for
Budget Responsibility to discount the sum when assessing whether HM
Treasury is on track to meet its 'self-imposed' targets (see Emmerson and
Tetlow, 2012). These transfers also strengthen the notion of central bank
‘independence’. Meier (2009, p. 44) reinforces the conventional ‘logic’:
[T]he public’s trust in the operational independence of the central bank
ultimately rests on the sustainability of the public finances. While this is
true under any circumstances, the notion gains particular salience at a
time when the central bank conducts significant purchases in the (fast-
growing) government bond market. This underscores the need for fiscal pol-
icy to resolutely dispel any doubts about sustainability.
So called ‘independence’, however, represents a political rather than opera-
tional issue. MMT rejects the notion of central bank independence, because
day-to-day monetary management by the central bank requires close collabo-
ration with the Treasury. Furthermore, MMT advocates emphasise the role
and purpose of the consolidated government sector (Treasury and central
bank) as the sole issuer of a fiat non-convertible currency and reject claims
that debt agencies, such as the UK Debt Management Office, effectively limit
the use of macroeconomic policy instruments (Lavoie, 2011; Juniper et al.
2013b).
Like ‘debt monetisation’ which reflects, in part, the institutional frame-
work for conducting monetary policy (i.e. floor or corridor system) and the
behavioural responses of the banks (Watts and Sharpe, 2013), QE is consid-
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ered to be inflationary and has been implemented in both Japan and the UK
with the explicit intention of increasing inflation. Despite this, claims that QE,
via asset purchases from the non-bank private sector, increases the stock of
broad money and hence inflation is just ‘harking back to the old and flawed
Monetarist doctrine based on the so-called Quantity Theory of Money. This
theory has no application in a modern monetary economy’ (Mitchell, 2009).
The European Central Bank (ECB) Vice-President is clear: 
Central bank reserves are held by banks and are not part of money held by
the non-financial sector, hence not, per se, an inflationary type of liquidity.
There is no acceptable theory linking in a necessary way the monetary base
created by central banks to inflation. Nevertheless, it is argued by some
that financial institutions would be free to instantly transform their loans
from the central bank into credit to the non-financial sector. This fits into
the old theoretical view about the credit multiplier according to which the
sequence of money creation goes from the primary liquidity created by cen-
tral banks to total money supply created by banks via their credit decisions
(Constancio, 2011, p. 5, emphasis added).
Thus, any 'inflationary concerns associated with monetisation [QE]
should be largely attributed to the impact on aggregate demand via a fiscal
policy that is accommodated by the monetary authorities, who refrain from
raising rates' (Borio and Disyatat, 2009, p. 21). However, even if QE did stim-
ulate aggregate demand, given current excess productive capacity, firms will
respond to increased demand via increased capacity utilisation.10 Hence
demand-side inflation should not materialise until real productive capacity is
exhausted (or significant bottlenecks exist) (Mitchell and Muysken, 2008).
Constancio (2011) also refers to the ‘old’ money multiplier theory which
underpins the ‘bank lending channel’ outlined by Benford et al. (2009). The
money multiplier is 'based on the erroneous belief that the banks need
reserves before they can lend and that quantitative easing provides those
reserves’ (Mitchell, 2012b). This stems from the illusion that ‘a bank is an
institution that accepts deposits to build up reserves and then on-lends them
at a margin to make money’ (Mitchell, 2012b). MMT advocates reject the
money multiplier since it has incorrectly reversed the causality. Loans create
deposits which create reserves (Fullwiler, 2012).
Bernanke (2009) is also clear:
…the banking system has a large quantity of these [bank] reserves, but
they are electronic entries at the Fed. They basically just sit there. They’re
not in circulation. They're not part of any broad measure of the money sup-
ply. They’re part of what's called the monetary base.
If banks are short of reserves on any given day they can either borrow
from each other in the interbank market or from the central bank through the
T Sharpe and M Watts
- 56 -
discount window, but the latter facility imposes a penalty (higher interest cost)
(Mitchell, 2009; Borio and Disyatat, 2009).
[I]t is not deposits or reserve balances that constrain lending, but rather a
banks own choice to lend given the perceived profitability of a loan-which
can be affected by the ability to obtain deposits after the loan is made-and
also given a perceived creditworthy borrower…and sufficient capital
(Fullwiler, 2012).
However, UK consumers have revealed ‘a growing reluctance to borrow,
a deterioration in confidence about meeting repayments and an increase in
those reliant on credit to pay for essential items’ (PwC, 2012b, p. 5). ‘Despite
paying off an average of £355 in 2011, each household is still saddled with
around £7,900 in unsecured debt, leaving UK consumers still among the most
indebted in the world’ (PwC, 2012b, p. 4). Consequently, there has been ‘a
sharp increase in the household saving rate to about 7½ percent…as house-
holds seek to reduce their high level of indebtedness’ (IMF, 2012b, pp. 10-12).
Firms are also constrained. During Q3 2012, lenders reported that the
demand for credit from small and large UK companies had fallen and default
rates had increased (BoE, 2012c). This was attributed to a number of factors,
including weak consumer spending and a lack of capital investment opportu-
nities, ‘as firms have remained cautious given the current economic environ-
ment and uncertainty relating to the euro area’ (BoE, 2012c, p. 6). Capital
investment as a share of GDP remains at a post-war low (IMF, 2013). Baker
Tilly’s (2012) small and medium enterprise (SME) distress monitor revealed
that cash flows and profits were under serious threat. Specifically, 24 per cent
of SMEs had insufficient funds to meet their short-term debt obligations. This
is particularly problematic since SMEs account for more than 50 per cent of
private sector employment in the UK (IMF, 2012b).
Drawing on available evidence and the principles of MMT, the pursuit
of fiscal austerity by the Coalition government is likely to limit the impact of
QE on domestic demand (see Figure 1) since; (1) neither households nor firms
are likely to increase expenditure, given high levels of private debt and con-
siderable uncertainty; (2) while declines in credit risk premiums reduce the
cost of finance, it does not remove the uncertainty, particularly surrounding
the eurozone crisis, which has been identified as an important barrier to
investment among UK firms; and, (3) banks do not lend reserves, so that
increasing the ‘availability of bank credit’ will not stimulate lending in the
absence of credit worthy borrowers. The latter is synonymous with Keynes' ref-
erence to pushing on a string.
With UK fiscal policy being geared towards austerity and deficit reduc-
tion, policymakers (and the public) have sought solutions to the ongoing cri-
sis from central bankers. While central banks can reduce interest rates, dur-
ing a recession and heightened uncertainty, this is not a clear and effective
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means of stimulating aggregate demand. Likewise, in the US, Richard Fisher,
President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, notes that the
return to economic growth ‘cannot be accomplished by the FOMC [Federal
Open Market Committee] alone. Whatever [central bankers] do with monetary
policy will be of limited utility, if not counterproductive, unless it is comple-
mented by sensible fiscal policy that restores confidence and puts the
American people back to work’ (Fisher, 2010).
Fiscal stimulus is now required to stimulate aggregate demand and
employment in the UK. This would not threaten fiscal sustainability require-
ments nor intensify so called debt dynamics since the UK is a sovereign econ-
omy (Watts and Sharpe, 2013). As mentioned, IMF (2012a) now concedes that
fiscal multipliers are higher than previously thought, in the range of 0.9 to 1.7.
Mitchell (2012b) succinctly summarises the options policymakers face with
regard to stimulatory measures: 
Treasury fiscal operations which directly inject aggregate demand into the
spending stream are likely to be more effective than asset swaps which lead
to an increase in reserves but do nothing to improve the confidence of the
households and firms. After all, quantitative easing does not lead to job
offers as a matter of course. Fiscal policy can be expressed in terms of
explicit job offers and you cannot get a more direct stimulus than that.
5. CONCLUSION
QE has been undertaken by the Bank of England since 2009 to stem defla-
tionary pressures in the context of weak demand growth following the worst
economic downturn since the Great Depression. Inflation has since recovered,
but real GDP growth remains weak, and unemployment rates are stubbornly
high. The preference for unconventional monetary measures over fiscal stim-
ulus reflects the strength of the prevailing neo-liberal doctrine. However, UK
policy rates remain at their lowest practical level and the evidence about the
effectiveness of QE in influencing macroeconomic outcomes is unconvincing.
Nevertheless, at the time of writing, the UK government remains com-
mitted to its small government agenda, since fiscal policy is considered to be
largely ineffective. This strengthens its commitment to fiscal austerity to
reduce the debt to GDP ratio. In this vein, additional asset purchases have not
been ruled out by BoE officials (see Telegraph, 2012).
QE is not the only option for UK policymakers. Advocates of Modern
Monetary Theory argue that fiscal stimulus offers a proven transmission
mechanism to stimulate aggregate demand growth in a sovereign economy,
without promoting adverse debt and deficit dynamics (Watts and Sharpe,
2013). For the UK, a sovereign economy, the return to sustained growth faces
only an ideological barrier.
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ENDNOTES
1. Newcastle Business School and the Centre of Full Employment and Equity,
University of Newcastle, University Drive, Callaghan, Australia, timothy.sharpe@new-
castle.edu.au; martin.watts@newcastle.edu.au.
2. An example of the signalling channel is a long-term commitment to a low official (pol-
icy) rate. In mid-December 2012, the Federal Reserve committed itself to maintain the
Federal Funds rate close to zero until the unemployment rate dropped below 6.5 per
cent, subject to the persistence of a low inflation rate. As a consequence, interest rates
were expected to remain low until at least mid-2015.
3. Another early form of unconventional monetary policy was ‘Operation Twist’ (1961-
1965) which involved the simultaneous purchase of long-term, and sale of short-term,
Treasury securities via open market operations conducted by the US Federal Reserve
(Modigliani and Sutch, 1966). Short-term interest rates increased, which was designed
to attract foreign capital and investment to stem a balance of payments crisis and gold
reserve drain. The economic context subsequently changed with the abandonment of
the Bretton Wood exchange rate system (1944-1971). The Fed now sets the policy rate
which is typically geared to an inflation target. In 2011, the US implemented a similar
‘Operation Twist’ strategy, ostensibly to avoid raising inflationary expectations.
4. The ‘banknote rule’ requires that the outstanding amount of long-term government
bonds held by the BoJ does not exceed the outstanding balance of banknotes issued.
5. This is further discussed in Section 4.
6. The BoE’s (2012b) contribution to public education, ‘Quantitative Easing Explained’,
appears designed to confuse with statements such as, ‘[t]he purpose of the purchases
was and is to inject money directly into the economy in order to boost nominal
demand.’ The BoE apparently wishes to perpetuate the spectre of helicopters dropping
cash into the UK economy, thereby directly injecting purchasing power to boost
demand and counter deflation (see Friedman, 1969). However we are then reassured
that asset purchases do not either ‘involve printing more banknotes’ or, following ear-
lier bailouts, ‘giving money to banks’ (BoE, 2012b).
7. The effect of asset purchases on international capital flows may also be non-negligi-
ble. Most estimates have focused on the US, for example, Fratzscher et al. (2012) find
that the Fed's interventions resulted in an international portfolio rebalance which was
more significant than its domestic rebalance. Chen et al. (2011) reveal that announce-
ment effects in the US had a significant impact on government bond yields, equity
prices and exchange rates among many emerging Asian and Latin American economies
(see also Akyüz, 2012; Suttle et al. 2012).
8. The findings of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), that the median real per capita GDP
growth rate in advanced economies falls when gross public debt reaches a critical
threshold share of GDP, has increased the urgency for fiscal austerity. Some UK poli-
cymakers have embraced this argument. Herndon et al. (2013, pp. 2-3) tried to repli-
cate Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2010) empirical work and found that 'coding errors, selec-
tive exclusion of available data, and unconventional weighting of summary statistics
lead to serious errors that inaccurately represent the relationship between public debt
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and growth among 20 advanced economies in the post-war period.’ Notwithstanding
this, there are difficulties in isolating a one-way causal relationship between the level
of debt and the growth rate, because causation also runs from slower growth to rising
debt, so all empirical estimates should be treated cautiously (see Sharpe, 2013b).
9. Both Japan and the US have been subject to credit downgrades in recent years with
minimal effect on their long-term bond rates. Furthermore, IMF (2012b, p. 38) concede
that ‘fiscal indicators such as deficit and debt levels appear to be weakly related to gov-
ernment bond yields for advanced economies with monetary independence’ (e.g. Japan,
US, UK).
10. OECD (2012) data reveal that UK output gaps have been negative since 2009.
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